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ABSTRACT 
For the past 17 years, United States Special Forces (USSF) has been decisively 
engaged in the Global War on Terror. Due to the deployment cycle and training 
requirements focused on deployments in the Middle East, many valuable skillsets, 
including the ability to fight, maneuver, and survive in extreme cold weather 
environments has atrophied across the force. In a majority of USSF units, extreme cold 
weather training is synonymous with high altitude and mountaineering training. Some 
teams and units do specialize in this type of terrain and train to a high level in technical 
mountaineering tasks, but too often the focus is on technical mountaineering skills and 
not how to survive and sustain operations in extreme cold weather environments. The 
recent 2018 National Defense Strategy, the multi-domain battle concept, and 
actions taken by peer and near-peer adversaries, all call for a shift in focus from the 
Middle East to adversaries such as Russia, China, and North Korea. Conflict with 
any of these adversaries will likely include some aspect of cold weather warfare. This 
research effort will define an adequate cold weather capability for USSF, and make 
recommendations to reach that capability. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................4 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT ...................................................................................7 
A. WINTER WAR ..........................................................................................7 
B. KOREAN WAR .........................................................................................8 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................11 
A. DOCTRINE ..............................................................................................11 
B. ACADEMIC PAPERS.............................................................................13 
C. NORWEGIAN COLD WEATHER TRAINING AND 
DOCTRINE ..............................................................................................14 
IV. THE THREAT AND CURRENT CAPABILITY .............................................17 
A. POTENTIAL HOT SPOTS FOR COLD WEATHER 
WARFARE ...............................................................................................17 
B. USSF CURRENT CAPABILITY ...........................................................23 
V. REQUIRED CAPABILITY ................................................................................27 
A. ANTARCTIC METHODOLOGY .........................................................28 
B. COLD WEATHER FRAMEWORK .....................................................29 
C. MEASURING CAPABILITY.................................................................32 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS TO BUILD CAPABILITY ..........................33 
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................35 
A. COMMAND EMPHASIS MUST BE PLACED ON COLD 
WEATHER READINESS .......................................................................35 
B. LEADERSHIP IN COLD WEATHER WARFARE ............................35 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY ...............................36 
APPENDIX .......................................................................................................................37 
A. LEVEL I TASKS AND SUB-TASKS ....................................................37 
B. LEVEL 2 TASKS AND SUB-TASKS ....................................................38 
C. LEVEL 3 TASKS AND SUB-TASKS ....................................................40 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................43 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................45 
viii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Cold Regions ..............................................................................................18 
Figure 2. Arctic Territorial Claims Map ...................................................................19 
Figure 3. Proficiency Framework ..............................................................................30 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAR  after action report 
AMWS  Army mountain warfare school 
AO   area of operations 
AOR   area of responsibility 
COA   course of action 
GWOT  global war on terrorism 
MCMWTC  Marine Corps mountain warfare training center 
MEDEVAC  medical evacuation 
METL  mission-essential task list 
NPS   Naval Postgraduate School 
NWTC  Northern warfare training center 
OCONUS       outside the continental Unites States 
ODA   operational detachment-Alpha 
PCS   permanent change of station 
SF   special forces 
SOAMS special operations advanced mountain school 
SFG(A)  special forces group (airborne) 
SOF   special operations forces 
TTP   tactics, techniques, and procedures 
1st SFC(A)  United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) 
USASOC  United States Army Special Operations Command 
USSOCOM  United States Special Operations Command 
UW   unconventional warfare 
VEO   violent extremist organization 
xii 




I would like to sincerely thank my advisory team, Dr. Burks and Dean McCormick. 
Their patience, guidance, and feedback proved invaluable in allowing me to complete this 
project.  
xiv 




A. BACKGROUND  
Since the start of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), several key capabilities have 
atrophied within United States Army Special Forces (USSF). Deployment cycles, pre-
mission training (PMT) requirements, and a focus on the operational environment in the 
CENTCOM area of operation have all contributed to this decline. Among these capabilities 
is a robust cold weather warfare capability.1  The Army defines cold weather environments 
as “regions where cold temperatures, unique terrain, and snowfall have a serious impact on 
military operations.”2 Operational plans requiring USSF to operate in extreme cold 
environments, peer adversaries operating in and contesting allied territorial claims in the 
Arctic, and maintaining a capability on par with key allies all require building and 
maintaining a robust cold weather warfare capability. Other than units required to operate 
in isolated operations in cold and mountainous areas in Afghanistan, cold weather warfare 
tasks are prioritized below other tasks, or non-existent within USSF, because proficiency 
in cold weather warfare is not deemed mission critical in the contemporary operating 
environment.3 As a result, a tendency exists to relegate cold weather training to the USSF 
mountaineering community. However, conflating cold weather training with 
mountaineering training has proved inadequate.4  Mountains are inherently cold, so it is 
vitally important that USSF mountaineers can operate in cold weather environments, but 
extreme cold does not necessarily require the presence of mountains. A distinction is 
required between mountain and cold weather warfare, and a broader swath of the force 
must be prepared to operate in cold, non-mountainous environments. As the military shifts 
                                                 
1 Seth Robson, “Cold-weather training ramps up as afghan combat mission Wraps Up,” Stars and 
Stripes, February 11, 2015, https://www.stripes.com/news/us/cold-weather-training-ramps-up-as-afghan-
combat-mission-wraps-up-1.328903. 
2 Department of the Army, Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations, ATP 3-90.97 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2016), 1–3. 
3 Scott Pierce, “Mountain and Cold Weather Warfighting: Critical Capability for the 21st Century,” 
(School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 2. 
4 CPT John Ferry, personal communication, February 21, 2018. 
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focus from insurgencies and violent extremist organizations in the Middle East, to peer or 
near-peer adversaries such as Russia, China, and North Korea, the possibility of larger 
formations of USSF personnel operating in extreme cold weather is a distinct possibility. 
The Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) concept is an approach for the U.S. to counter 
peer and near-peer adversaries in the 2025–2040 timeframe.5  The MDB concept calls for 
small, scalable, self-sustained units, to operate autonomously in hostile or denied 
environments against a peer or near-peer adversary. High-end war with North Korea, 
Russia, or China would certainly involve fighting in the cold, and as such, units need to be 
prepared to operate in that environment. While no unit would truly be able to “self-sustain” 
in an extreme cold environment, any amount of training that will improve survivability and 
lethality will benefit those units within the joint force required to operate in extreme 
conditions. Under the MDB concept, units must be capable operating in any operational 
environment.  
Special Operators are inherently adaptable soldiers; however, extreme cold is an 
unforgiving environment and the skills required to be successful are challenging to learn 
on the job or in isolation prior to executing an operation. Issuing state-of-the-art cold 
weather gear alone is not a solution. Operators must have real experience surviving and 
operating in extreme cold environments. When accustomed to operating in hot or temperate 
climates, many things are taken for granted such as battery life, fuel consumption, 
functionality of screens and devices, munition ballistics, and general mobility. These are 
just a few examples of factors that require training and experience to understand how the 
cold weather will impact them and operations. A unit deploying to an extreme cold weather 
operational environment who expects to conduct business as usual with the addition of a 
down parka and a warm sleeping bag will undoubtedly fail. That unit must dramatically 
adapt its tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to operate effectively. If the unit is 
unable to learn and adapt quickly, it will quickly become a liability, increasing the risk to 
personnel and their ability to accomplish the mission.  
                                                 
5 Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century (Department of the Army, 2017) 
http://www.arcic.army.mil/App_Documents/Multi-Domain-Battle-Evolution-of-Combined-Arms.pdf 
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Creating and maintaining any capability requires the valuable resources of time and 
money. Allocating resources to cold weather training will come at the cost of developing 
or maintaining other, perhaps equally important capabilities. Ensuring USSF is prepared to 
meet potential operational requirements with an adequate cold weather capability is 
challenging in a resource constrained environment. Requisite training methodologies, 
expertise, and equipment needed for operators to survive and fight in extreme cold weather 
exist inside and outside the Army. Further analysis is required to develop innovative ways 
of leveraging off the shelf resources and expertise to efficiently build capability. 
For the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Special 
Operations Advanced Mountain School (SOAMS) serves as the lead for SOF 
mountaineering.6 Aspects of the training conducted at SOAMS include cold weather 
training, but this training is focused on mountaineering operations. Within USSF, generally 
the only operators attending training at SOAMS come from mountain detachments, and as 
a result, mountain detachments are often the only units that have experience and training 
operating in extreme cold conditions. This is inadequate, given the potential threat of 
conflict in the Arctic, North Asia, or Northeastern Europe with the current emphasis on 
countering the threats promulgated by revisionist states. The 10th Special Forces Group 
(SFG) addressed this concern in 2018 through the formation of a cold weather warfare 
committee internal to the Group, tasked to provide cold weather training (not 
mountaineering) to the Group’s formations.7 The 10th SFG formed this committee because 
10th SFG, who partners with NATO SOF, realized that their partners often maintain a 
significantly better cold weather warfare capability.8 Operators unprepared for operating 
in a cold weather environment, training alongside NATO SOF allies, could pose a liability 
to their partners. In order to maintain relevancy and operational preparedness in the cold 
weather environment, 10th SFG realized the importance of building adequate capability. 
6 United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Forces Baseline Interoperable 
Standards - Mountaineering Operations, 350–34 (MacDill Air Force Base: United States Special 
Operations Command, 2017). 
7 SGM Rolf Jensen, personal communication, February 15, 2018. 
8 SGM Rolf Jensen, personal communication, February 15, 2018. 
4 
The challenge 10th Group and the other groups will face in conducting cold weather 
training is the aforementioned lack of relevant doctrine and resources. Mountain and cold 
weather training centers do not have the capacity to focus their training specifically on cold 
weather and provide the throughput necessary to train a broad swath of the force. Units 
require detailed manuals and TTPs in order to conduct unit level training on cold weather 
tasks. Analysis is required to determine what an adequate level of proficiency is for USSF, 
and how to best achieve that proficiency. USSF has a unique mission set, and certain cold 
weather training tasks may be more important than others. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How should USSF ensure that it is prepared to provide sufficient forces capable of 
countering threats while fighting and surviving in an extreme cold weather environment? 
1. Methodology
Building on lessons learned from the Winter War (1939-1940) and Korean War 
(1950-1953), this research will make the case for why a robust cold weather warfare 
capability is necessary in the future and define what that capability needs to be for USSF. 
Utilizing the Multi-Domain Battle concept, and current threats from Russia, China, and 
North Korea, this research effort will analyze the threat and make a case for the likelihood 
of USSF, having to operate in the cold. The contemporary threats promulgated by 
revisionist states compel our joint force to be prepared to counter their capability in any 
environment and in any domain. A land war in northern Europe or Asia, as evidenced from 
historical examples, will certainly involve some aspect of cold weather warfare.   
The result of this research will be recommendations to 1st Special Forces Command 
(A) regarding the operational necessity of cold weather training, and how to leverage 
resources to ensure that USSF is prepared to meet future operational requirements with an 
adequate capability. This research will cover: future operational requirements and required 
capability for USSF, analysis of current capability, gaps in current training venues and 
doctrine, analysis of cold weather training tasks required to support the USSF mission, 
development of a recommended framework to measure proficiency, and recommendations 
to efficiently build capability. 
5 
In order to analyze current capability, this research effort will compile data from 
the five Active Duty SFGs to ascertain their current cold weather warfare capability. This 
research effort will only use data from the last two years, because the average turnover of 
ODA members is two to three years. If an ODA has not trained on a given task in two 
years, it can be assumed they are not proficient on the task. 
This research effort will analyze current cold weather doctrine and training venues 
to determine what gaps exist in doctrine and the various mountain and cold weather training 
centers will be researched to assess their throughput and period of instruction (POI). Once 
this research effort understands the current resources available to Operators, it will become 
apparent what is currently possible, and where future resources need to be invested. 
This research effort will conduct analysis of cold weather training tasks required to 
support the USSF mission to assess what aspects of cold weather training must be 
prioritized to ensure ODAs can reach an adequate capability. USSF mission sets are unique, 
and the training will likely need to be tailored to support the unique mission set. Aspects 
of USSF missions often require operators to conduct operations with autonomy, further 
away from logistical support and infrastructure then conventional units. Extreme 
environments make this even more difficult and require operators to be well versed in how 
to thrive in the operational environment. Once this research effort defines and recommends 
an adequate capability for USSF, it will develop a framework which will break down the 
necessary cold weather tasks. This framework can measure an individual unit’s level of 
proficiency. 
Once the operational necessity of creating and maintaining a robust cold weather 
warfare capability is established, and analysis is conducted on cold weather training tasks 
required of operators, the research effort will develop a recommendation on where to invest 
resources in order to fill the gap in current resources and training venues which will allow 
USSF to reach an adequate level of capability. 
6 
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II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
History is filled with case studies demonstrating that a lack of preparedness for 
operating in extreme cold weather increases risk to personnel and their ability to 
accomplish their mission. Two historical case studies that demonstrate the successes and 
failures of opponents with disparate capability to conduct cold weather warfare are the 
Russo-Finnish Winter War, and the Korean War. In both these conflicts, the weaker side 
gained an asymmetrical advantage over their opponent due to their enhanced cold weather 
warfare capability. Survivability, mobility, and lethality are the three components of 
proficiency in cold weather warfare, which together, build the capability to successfully 
operate in the cold. The following vignettes demonstrate the importance of survivability, 
mobility, and lethality in the cold weather environment.  
A. WINTER WAR 
During the Winter War, Finland demonstrated that soldiers prepared for the cold 
can defeat their opponent, even when faced with overwhelming odds.9 The Finns gained a 
tactical and operational advantage over the Soviets by outmatching the Soviets proficiency 
in cold weather mobility, and survivability. At the outset of the war, Finnish soldiers were 
capable cross-country skiers, wore proper clothing which protected them from the harsh 
temperature (regularly reaching -50 degrees Fahrenheit) and provided camouflage against 
the snow. The majority of the Soviet infantry were not equipped with skis, which inhibited 
mobility, and wore standard khaki uniforms, which did not provide adequate warmth or 
camouflage in the snow, inhibiting survivability. While the dismounted Soviet infantry 
struggled and often failed to simply survive in the harsh conditions, Finnish Soldiers used 
their training and environment to their advantage. The freedom of maneuver and protection 
from the harsh conditions enjoyed by the Finns enabled them to penetrate Soviet lines and 
conduct hit-and-run tactics further demoralizing the Soviet troops. In the battles of 
                                                 
9 Chris Mann and Christer Jorgensen. Hitler’s Arctic War: The German Campaigns in Norway, 
Finland, and the USSR 1940–1945. South Yorkshire: Brown Bear Books Unlimited, 2002. 
8 
Tolvajarvi and Suomassalmi in December 1939 and January 1940, one Brigade of Finnish 
Soldiers destroyed two Soviet Divisions.10  
B. KOREAN WAR 
During the winter of 1950–1951, the harshest winter of the Korean War, U.S. 
Forces learned many hard lessons. The 1st Marine Division faced temperatures ranging 
from 20 degrees Fahrenheit to -30 degrees Fahrenheit during their march from Chinhung-
ni to Udam-ni near the Chosin Reservoir. Heavier than usual snowfall and high wind 
created deep snowdrifts, and slopes loaded with wind slabs in steeper terrain restricted 
mobility. The Chinese, much more accustomed to operating in their home terrain and 
climate, utilized dismounted tactics carrying light weapons supported by crew-served 
machine guns that enabled them to maneuver on the less mobile Marines who were often 
tied to defensive positions and larger artillery pieces.11  The Marines quickly learned that 
much of their training and understanding of how to employ weapons did not apply while 
operating in sub-zero temperatures, which greatly inhibited the Marines lethality.12  Mortar 
systems were significantly impacted by the cold, and challenging to employ. In order to 
seat the mortar’s baseplate properly, holes must be dug through the snow to reach the 
ground. If the ground was frozen hard in subzero temperatures, the ground would not give 
way while the mortar was fired, causing the baseplates to fracture. Frozen ground also 
impacted the Marines’ ability to dig foxholes and fortify positions, often requiring 
explosives to dig in. Utilizing the proper lubrication to ensure the continued functioning of 
weapons also proved critical.  “Arctic” lubrication is required in machine guns and carbines 
when the temperature dips below subzero. If normal lubrication is used, the weapon system 
is prone to seizing.13  Restricted mobility often prevented the Marines from utilizing 
                                                 
10 Mann and Jorgensen, Hitler’s Arctic War: The German Campaigns in Norway, Finland, and the 
USSR 1940–1945, 28. 
11 Department of the Navy, Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea: Winter of 1950–
1951, FMFRP 12–6 (Quantico: Department of the Navy, 1989), 6. 
12 Karl Warner, “Combating Cold Korea,” U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, November 10, 
2010, https://www.army.mil/article/47963/combating_cold_korea.  
13 Department of the Navy, Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea: Winter of 1950–
1951, 20-23. 
9 
support from vehicle supported artillery, heavy mortars, and armor. Because the enemy 
often closed on the Marines’ positions rapidly, which precluded the use of close air support, 
the Marines were required to fight using close quarters tactics: hand grenades, small arms, 
bayonets, and even hand-to-hand fighting. After action reports suggest that the Marines did 
not anticipate this sort of fight and should have spent more time devoting training to these 
tactics,14 which would have increased their lethality. 
Both the Winter War and the Korean Winter Campaign of 1950–1951 demonstrate 
that underestimating the impacts of the cold, by assuming that the same tactics used in 
warmer climates can be employed, are errors which can have serious consequences. While 
primarily conventional conflicts, lessons learned from these cases are applicable to 
contemporary SOF operations in a cold weather environment. The small unit hit-and-run 
tactics employed by the Finns in the Winter War, and the mobility enjoyed by the Chinese 
in the Korean War were decisive in both conflicts. The ability to execute small unit raids 
and provide enhanced mobility in restricted environments are salient aspects of SOF 
operations and capabilities. It is critical to remember these successes and failures to ensure 
that historical lessons are not lost. This is particularly important today, when fighting in 
cold weather environments is a very real possibility.  
 
  
                                                 
14 Department of the Navy, Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea: Winter of 1950–1951, 
36. 
10 












III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Providing units with the necessary resources to conduct their own training is the 
only way to build adequate capability at the unit level. For cold weather warfare, adequate 
capability is measured through proficiency in survivability, mobility, and lethality training 
tasks. Training centers are an excellent venue for individual training, but even when a unit 
pays to send Operators to school, turnover and PCS cycles often prevent units from 
maintaining proficiency. Learning how to survive and operate in the cold are not complex 
tasks, but they do require resources in terms of manuals, the right equipment, and access 
to appropriate environments. Repetition builds experience and capability at the unit level. 
A. DOCTRINE 
The Army and Marine Corps maintain three manuals which serve as doctrine for 
cold weather operations; Mountain Leader’s Guide to Winter Operations,15 Cold Regions 
Operations,16 and Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations.17 In addition to these 
manuals, training centers such at the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center 
(MCMWTC) in Bridgeport, California, the Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) in 
Black Rapids, Alaska, and the Army Mountain Warfare School (AMWS) in Camp Ethan 
Allen, Vermont, publish pamphlets and internal documents which support their respective 
training courses.18 To reinforce the idea that the Army conflates mountaineering and cold 
weather warfare, the most recently updated ATP is titled, “Mountain Warfare and Cold 
Weather Operations.” In the introduction, “Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather 
Operations” suggests that while very few U.S. military units specialize in mountainous or 
cold weather environments, competitors exist who do maintain the capability to sustain 
                                                 
15 Department of the Navy, Mountain Leader’s Guide to Winter Operations, MCRP 3–35.1B 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2013) 
16 Department of the Army, Cold Region Operations, ATP 3–97.11 (Washington, DC: Department of 
the Army, 2011). 
17 Department of the Army, Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations, ATP 3-90.97 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2016) 
18 United States Army Northern Warfare Training Center. Cold Weather (CWLC, CWOC & CWIC) 
Student Handout. Black Rapids, AK, 2015. 
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operations in an extreme cold environment.19  The manual is large in scope but wanting in 
detail. It is primarily focused on the operational-level planner. It addresses a broad range 
of planning considerations; but does not provide sufficient detail at the tactical level in how 
to specifically conduct training or operate in the cold. The manual directs units toward the 
NWTC, MCMWTC, and AMWS for individual soldiers and Brigade level units to conduct 
training in mountain or cold weather warfare.   
Cold Region Operations is significantly more detailed then Mountain Warfare and 
Cold Weather Operations. Cold Region Operations is more useful to the Operator at the 
tactical level, as it covers terrain and weather analysis, cold weather injuries, nutrition, 
wear of uniforms, self-care, mobility, weapons considerations, tactical considerations, and 
sustainment.20 The purpose of Cold Region Operations is to provide Soldiers and Marines 
the resources to conduct full spectrum operations in a cold weather environment. The 
limitation of this manual is that it is primarily directed toward conventional forces. USSF 
often uses off the shelf equipment, and specialized, small-unit TTPs which fall outside the 
scope of this manual.  
Similar to Cold Region Operations, The Marine Corps’ Mountain Leader’s Guide 
to Winter Operations provides a wealth of information useful to Operators at the tactical 
level, however, it is focused toward conventional forces. This manual is primarily focused 
toward cold weather operations in mountainous terrain, and covers topics such as 
operations in avalanche prone terrain, ski techniques, glacier travel, and snow shelters.21 
While this information is useful, it is primarily directed toward units required to operate in 
technical mountain terrain, which falls outside the scope of this research which is focused 
on the training necessary for USSF units, other than Mountain Detachments, to survive and 
fight in cold, non-technical terrain.  
                                                 
19 Department of the Army, Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations. 
20 Department of the Army, Cold Region Operations. 
21 Department of the Navy, Mountain Leader’s Guide to Winter Operations, MCRP 3–35.1B 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2013). 
13 
Current Army or Marine Corps organization does not account for units specializing 
in mountainous or cold weather environments.22  Additionally, no actual proponent exists 
specifically for cold weather operations.23  Each of the mountain and cold weather training 
centers maintain internal documents, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs),24 for 
operating in cold and mountainous environments, but most of these resources support the 
associated training course from which they were derived. While valuable resources, these 
documents do not serve as doctrine. Current doctrine primarily targets conventional units 
and capabilities. Detailed doctrine specifically related to Special Operations in cold 
weather environments is lacking. A gap exists in doctrine that specifically supports USSF 
unit level training and education. 
B. ACADEMIC PAPERS 
Several academic papers written by military officers discuss the importance of 
reinvigorating mountain and cold weather training.25  While these papers provide excellent 
analysis and make a strong case for the necessity of competent military mountaineers (who 
can operate in the extreme cold), they generally continue to propagate the idea that 
mountain and cold weather training are synonymous. Two recent Naval Postgraduate 
School theses by MAJ Dennis Cook and MAJ Edwin Clarke examine the SOF 
mountaineering training program through the lens of the operational requirements at the 
Group level.26  Cook and Clarke both acknowledge that regionally aligned SF Groups may 
have significantly disparate operational requirements.  10th and 1st SFG, who are regionally 
oriented toward Europe and Asia respectively, are more likely to encounter technical, high 
altitude, and cold mountain terrain then the other Groups.27  In addition to the mountains, 
                                                 
22 Pierce, “Mountain and Cold Weather Warfighting: Critical Capability for the 21st Century,” 7–8. 
23 United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Forces Baseline Interoperable 
Standards - Mountaineering Operations. 
24 United States Army Northern Warfare Training Center. Cold Weather (CWLC, CWOC & CWIC) 
Student Handout. Black Rapids, AK, 2015. 
25 Lt Col Pierce, “Mountain and Cold Weather Warfighting: Critical Capability for the 21st Century.” 
26 Edwin Clarke, “Enhancing the U.S. Special Operations Mountaineering Program,” (Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
27 Dennis Cook, “Optimizing the Special Forces Mountaineering Program.” 
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those regional areas have non-mountainous environments that are cold. The operational 
environment dictates that mountain detachments should not be the only formations capable 
of operating in the cold. Frameworks exist which measure the capability of Mountain 
Detachments to operate in cold and mountainous environments, but no such framework 
exists for other detachments to measure proficiency in operating in the cold alone. If the 
U.S. were to engage in high end war with a peer or near-peer competitor in the high north, 
large formations of USSF, in addition to Mountain Detachments, would be required to 
operate in a cold environment. 
C. NORWEGIAN COLD WEATHER TRAINING AND DOCTRINE 
The Norwegian School of Winter Warfare (NSWW) is considered a premier winter 
warfare training center, and Norway is also home to the NATO Cold Weather Center of 
Excellence. NSWW is the proponent for Norwegian cold weather operations, and in 
addition to providing training, NSWW maintains and updates several detailed manuals 
which cover various aspects of cold weather warfare. The most recently updated manuals 
were published between 2010–2013. The manuals are titled: Winter Conditions Leadership 
and Training, Personal Clothing, Nutrition, Winter Injuries, Safe Routing and Navigation, 
Bivouac, Use and Maintenance of Equipment, Snow Awareness, and Avalanche Rescue.28  
These manuals provide units the detailed information required to conduct unit level 
training, as they provide sufficient information for an inexperienced unit to conduct safe 
training.   
Another reason the Norwegians maintain excellent capability across their force, is 
that they recognize the distinction between mountain and cold weather warfare. The arctic, 
sub-arctic tundra, and northern steppes of Asia are all areas that are often featureless, 
relatively low in elevation, yet bitterly cold. Large military formations in the past have 
operated in these environments, and they will likely do so again. The risks associated with 
being unprepared to operate in the cold are profound, and the lessons learned from previous 
operational successes and failures should not be forgotten. It is critically important to 
                                                 
28 The Norwegian Armed Forces, Instruction in winter service - winter conditions, leadership and 
training, UD 6–81-1E (Rena Military Camp, Norwegian School of Winter Warfare, 2013). 
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separate mountain and cold weather warfare because it is simply not feasible for large 
formations to reach an acceptable level of proficiency in military mountaineering due to 
the technical considerations and specialization that it requires. If the majority of cold 
weather training is conducted as a consequence of training in the mountains, too many 
formations will never receive proper training. Cold weather training does not necessarily 
require the same specialization and focus of mountaineering and can be incorporated 
concurrently into other training tasks if units are provided the resources to conduct the 
training safely. Prevention of cold weather injuries is paramount, and simply understanding 
how to properly prevent injury is a big step in improving survivability and conducting 
training safely.29 
 
                                                 
29 Degroot, David, John Castellani, Jeffrey Williams, Paul Amoroso. “Epidemiology of U.S. Army 
Cold Weather Injuries, 1980 –1999.” Aviat Space and Environ Med, no. 74 (May 2003): 564–570. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12751587, 3. 
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IV. THE THREAT AND CURRENT CAPABILITY 
A. POTENTIAL HOT SPOTS FOR COLD WEATHER WARFARE 
The military defines cold regions as, “any region where cold temperatures, unique 
terrain, and snowfall significantly affect military operations for one month or more each 
year.”30 Cold regions are further subdivided into three categories; the arctic (area north of 
latitude 66 32’ N), subarctic (area north of latitude 50 to arctic), and temperate sub-regions 
(areas south of subarctic impacted by cold).31 Collectively, these three regions encompass 
a substantial portion of the earth that includes the Arctic, Antarctica, most of North 
America, Europe, Central Asia, and North Asia. In addition to these defined regions, 
several cold and mountainous sub-regions exist closer to the equator. These regions include 
the Caucuses, Andes, Himalaya, Hindu Kush mountain ranges, and their adjoining higher 
altitude areas.  
Figure 1 depicts the cold regions of the world as defined in Mountain Warfare and 
Cold Weather Operations. The military defines the areas north of line A in the northern 
hemisphere, and south of line A in the southern hemisphere as severely cold. In these areas, 
“mean annual temperatures stay below freezing, maximum snow depths exceed 60 cm, and 
ice covers lakes and rivers for more than 180 days each year.”  This area encompasses most 
of Canada, the Arctic, Antarctica, Greenland, and northeastern Russia. The areas of the 
northern and southern hemispheres between lines A and B are defined as moderately cold. 
This area encompasses most of the United States and Eurasia, where the mean temperature 
is below freezing during the coldest months of the year. The current threat of conflict in 
many of these areas is substantial, and it is imperative to ensure forces are available who 
are prepared to operate in these environments. 
                                                 
30 Department of the Army, Cold Region Operations, 1-1. 
31 Department of the Army, Cold Region Operations, 1-1. 
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Figure 1. Cold Regions32 
The United States is being challenged by peer and near-peer adversaries (as well as 
violent extremist organizations) in all of the above defined cold regions within the northern 
hemisphere. Revisionist states militarizing and contesting territorial claims in the Arctic, 
the looming potential for conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Russia’s anti-NATO rhetoric 
threatening the Baltic states, and conflicts amongst allies and VEOs operating in central 
Asia are all reasons to seriously consider the prospect of USSF operating in these cold 
regions. 
1. The Arctic 
As global warming melts the polar ice caps, areas in the Arctic which were 
previously inaccessible are now becoming trafficable.33 The Arctic is rich in natural 
resources, and several states maintain territorial claims to the region. Competition to 
exploit newly accessible natural resources, securing land and militarizing the region to 
protect shipping, and dominating new avenues of approach between continents could set 
the conditions for a new cold war.34 
                                                 
32 Source: Department of the Army, Cold Region Operations, 1-2. 
33 Caroline Mortimer, “Russia is building up its Arctic military presence and NATO should be 
worried, says new report,” Independent, September 7, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/russia-arctic-military-presence-nato-worried-us-report-tensions-north-america-a7934741.html. 
34 Todd South, “A New Cold War,” Army Times, July 30, 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/news/
your-army/2018/07/30/a-new-cold-war-how-the-army-is-preparing-for-a-fight-in-the-arctic/. 
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As depicted in Figure 2, Denmark, Norway, Canada, Russia, and the United States 
all maintain a territorial claim to some portion of the Arctic. The untapped oil and natural 
gas potential of the Arctic is estimated at $35 trillion, making the region ripe for 
exploitation. In addition to the raw materials, utilizing the arctic to transport goods is 
becoming incredibly profitable. Transporting goods between East Asia and Northern 
Europe along the Northern Sea route cuts of 30–40% of the distance ships are required to 
travel through the traditional Suez Canal route.   
  
Figure 2. Arctic Territorial Claims Map35 
                                                 
35 Source: South, “A New Cold War: How the Army Is Preparing for a Fight in the Arctic.” 
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Currently, out of all the nation-states with a territorial claim in the Arctic, Russia is 
in the lead in terms of strategy, spending, and infrastructure development. The Arctic was 
sliced up in the early 1990s following the fall of the Soviet Union, and Russia contends 
that it was forced to negotiate from a position of weakness. Russia is currently attempting 
to expand their territorial claim and dominate the region. Russia’s current strategy in the 
Arctic employs a number of military, diplomatic, legal, and economic tools to expand their 
claim in the region. Militarily, Russia has manufactured and deployed several new nuclear 
powered icebreaking ships (outmatching U.S. and NATO capability), built over 12 new 
airfields, 16 deep water ports, 20 air defense radar sites, and established cold weather 
training centers to train their ground and naval forces in preparation to operate in the 
region.36  
In 2015, Russia established the northernmost military base in the world, located 
along the 80th parallel on the island of Alexandra Land.37 The base is designed to house 
up to 150 soldiers for a period of 18 months, and allows the Russians train their soldiers, 
exercise command and control, and sustainment of units operating in the Arctic for 
extended periods. The ability to train and exercise this capability provides the Russians an 
advantage in terms of preparing forces to operate Arctic. 
Russia is not the only revisionist state aggressively investing in the Arctic. China, 
a country with no legitimate territorial claim in the Arctic, but with a growing Navy and 
economic capacity to underwrite Arctic infrastructure projects, is expanding its influence 
in the region in an effort to expand its markets.38 Chinese shipping companies have begun 
utilizing Arctic trade routes, and China announced its claim to develop what it refers to as 
the “Polar Silk Road.” China’s stated policy goals in the Arctic are; “to understand, protect, 
develop and participate in the Governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common 
                                                 
36 Daniel Goure, “U.S. & NATO Need an Arctic Strategy to Counter Russia,” Real Clear Defense, 
November 8, 2017, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/11/08/
us__nato_need_an_arctic_strategy_to_counter_russia_112602.html.  
37AFP, “Russia builds massive Arctic military base,” The Telegraph, October 20, 2015, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11944219/Russia-builds-massive-Arctic-
military-base.html. 
38 Dillow, “Russia and China Vie to Beat the U.S. in the Trillion-Dollar Race to Control the Arctic.” 
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interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote 
sustainable development in the Arctic.”39   
As revisionist states aggressively pursue sophisticated strategies to dominate the 
Arctic, it is imperative that NATO, the US, and Canada develop a strategy to counter 
Russian and Chinese efforts to control the region. Unfortunately, the U.S. is behind its 
adversaries in these efforts.40 In order to deter Russia and China from encroaching on U.S. 
and allied territorial claims and dominate the region, the U.S. and its allies must develop a 
legitimate military capability, able to demonstrate force in the Arctic, to act as a deterrent. 
This requires greater investment in icebreaker ships, military bases and infrastructure, 
expanded naval presence, and ground troops capable of operating in the Arctic.  
2. North Korea 
While the Arctic is a developing region of potential conflict, other problem areas 
throughout the globe exist where U.S. troops would be required to operate in the cold if the 
U.S. entered into a conflict. North Korea remains a viable threat to U.S. National Security. 
As the U.S. learned during the Korean War, operating in North Korea during the winter 
months is a brutal prospect. The 1st Marine Division’s experiences during the Korean War 
demonstrate that proficiency in mobility, survivability, and lethality are critical while 
fighting in the cold terrain on the Korean Peninsula. With tensions escalating between the 
U.S. and North Korea, any unit potentially called upon to deploy to the Korean Peninsula 
in crisis should conduct extensive cold weather warfare training as part of that unit’s 
standard, annual training requirements. Temperatures in North Korea often drop to -30 
degrees Fahrenheit in the winter months, and regardless of the time of year that hostilities 
begin, the conflict would likely prove long enough that troops on the peninsula would face 
fighting in the winter months.  
                                                 
39 China’s Arctic Policy (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 
Beijing, 2018) http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 
40 Dillow, “Russia and China Vie to Beat the U.S. in the Trillion-Dollar Race to Control the Arctic.” 
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3. Russia 
In Europe, Russia continues to antagonize and implicitly threaten NATO’s eastern 
flank, particularly in the Baltic region which includes; Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
and Finland. Russia’s recent activities in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Georgia, coupled 
with Putin’s increased anti-NATO rhetoric, create a significant concern for conflict in the 
region. In late 2018, Russia, China, and Mongolia took part in the largest military exercise 
since the Cold War, Vostok 2018. The exercise took place in eastern Siberia, and aspects 
of the exercise included cold weather training for the estimated 300+ thousand troops 
taking part in the exercise.41 While a major conventional military clash between Russia and 
NATO is possible, it is unlikely, and in the contemporary environment, conflict will likely 
be carried out by SOF forces in the “grey zone” area of conflict. This concept of persistent 
grey zone conflicts in eastern Europe necessitates that SOF, more so than conventional 
forces, must be prepared to operate in the high north. USSF partners and allies in the high 
north region maintain a robust cold weather warfare capability, and it is imperative that 
USSF can match or exceed their capability in order to maintain relevance. Additionally, if 
conflict escalated into war, environmental conditions would necessitate USSF to operate 
in the cold, high north operational environment.   
4. Central Asia 
Other than the threat of North Korea, there is potential for conflict across cold areas 
of Asia and Central Asia. The geography of Asia and Central Asia is dominated by the 
Himalaya and its subranges. The water runoff from the Himalaya forms the major river 
systems which sustain life and shape trade across the continent, and the high-altitude 
steppes surrounding the range make a unique, cold climate in many areas relatively close 
to the equator. Additionally, this region has a nexus of four major nuclear powers (Russia, 
China, India and Pakistan), several countries with Islamic separatists and extremists, one 
ongoing U.S. conflict (Afghanistan), and one ongoing major conflict between two nuclear 
                                                 
41 Andrew Higgins, “300,000 Troops and 900 Tanks: Russia’s Biggest Military Drills Since Cold 
War,” New York Times, August 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/world/europe/russia-
military-drills.html. 
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states over the Jammu-Kashmir region (India and Pakistan).42 This region is a hotbed of 
ethnic hostilities, ungoverned spaces, hosts routes trafficked by violent extremist 
organizations, and holds substantial, untapped natural resources. Conflict anywhere within 
this region will include some aspect of cold weather warfare. 
B. USSF CURRENT CAPABILITY 
In measuring the quality of cold weather training, it is important to evaluate the 
training through the lenses of increasing proficiency in mobility, survivability, and 
lethality. As discussed in previous chapters, these three areas are the components of 
proficiency which build capability. Mobility measures a unit’s ability to move and 
maneuver, mounted or dismounted, in the cold weather operational environment. 
Survivability measures a unit’s capability to self-sustain and thrive in the cold weather 
operational environment, and lethality measures a unit’s ability to bring lethal force to bear 
on the enemy. 
Given the likelihood of USSF operating in a cold weather environment while facing 
future threats, it is imperative to understand USSF’s current capability to fight in the cold. 
In an effort to ascertain the current cold weather warfare capability across USSF, this 
research effort collected after action reports (AARs) of ODAs conducting cold weather 
training during a two-year period (April 2015-April 2017). From the five active duty 
Special Forces Groups (SFGs), this research effort obtained nine AARs. While it is likely 
that more training was conducted without producing a formal AAR, the lack of documented 
cold weather training from the SFGs suggest that across the force, USSF is not conducting 
significant cold weather training.  
In addition to the lack of total training, a majority of the training documented within 
the AARs was conducted by Mountain Detachments. Much of this training consisted of 
mobility training, which amounted to downhill ski training inside of established ski resorts, 
followed by backcountry or cross-country skiing during the execution of a full mission 
42 Pierce, “Mountain and Cold Weather Warfighting: Critical Capability for the 21st Century,” 40. 
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profile or other training requirement. The evidence obtained in the AARs, supports the 
premise that a majority of cold weather training conducted by USSF is currently executed 
by Mountain Detachments, as a consequence of their mountaineering mission essential task 
list (METL) training.  
A common theme throughout the AARs was a lack of survivability training. While 
the ODAs did train mobility tasks by conducting ski, snowshoe, and snowmobile training, 
they consistently failed to improve their proficiency in survivability by subjecting 
themselves to long periods (greater than 24 hours) of continuous exposure to the cold 
weather environment. Additionally, lethality tasks were often not addressed. Units must 
understand the nuanced impacts of cold weather on their weapon systems and their ability 
to employ them. Simply conducting short-duration mobility training is not adequate.    
Part of the problem is USSOCOM and USASOC do not currently require units to 
conduct cold weather training as part of their unit readiness on a large scale. USSOCOM 
manual 350–34 (2017) is the training directive that specifically outlines cold weather 
training standards for SOF, but it does so in the context of training for mountaineering 
operations.43 350–34 outlines specific cold weather tasks which must be trained in order to 
gain and maintain a qualification as a basic mountaineer, senior mountaineer, or mountain 
leader. In accordance with USSOCOM policies, the only SOF personnel required to 
conduct such training are those personnel assigned to Mountaineering Detachments. 
Additionally, much of this required training is individual training. Rarely, do units exercise 
staff functions above the ODA level, conduct mission command training while subordinate 
units are conducting complex tactical missions sets in a cold weather environment, or 
conduct sustainment and support operations above the ODA level, nor are the units 
required to do so. 
Within the past year (2017-2018), 1st and 10th SFG (A), responsible for operating 
within PACOM and EUCOM respectively, have attempted to address this concern through 
the formation of Winter Warfare Committees, internal to the Group, which are responsible 
                                                 
43 United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Forces Baseline Interoperable 
Standards - Mountaineering Operations. 
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for managing and providing cold weather training to the Group at large. As these 
committees were only recently established, it is unknown at this time how effective they 
will be at improving the Group’s overall cold weather warfare capability. Some of the 
challenges facing the committees are a lack of external funding support, or standardized 
procedures for conducting the training. Since the training is not defined or mandated by a 
higher command, the Groups are required to self-fund these initiatives and training is 
dictated by the needs of the Group. The flexibility to adapt training to the Group’s specific 
requirements may be helpful to the Groups internally, however, a lack of oversight, 
policies, no clearly defined readiness standard, or allocated funding will likely challenge 
the effectiveness of these initiatives.  
In order to ensure that an adequate capability can be met, that capability must be 
defined (in terms of associated survivability, mobility, and lethality tasks), and a 
framework must exist which breaks down specific training tasks that are required to meet 
that capability. The framework will dictate a defined level of proficiency, which can be 
determined based off an operational requirement. Once units conduct the training specified 
within the framework, Commanders will understand the actual capabilities of their 
subordinate units, and they will be empowered to make better informed decisions regarding 
resource allocation and unit employment. 
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V. REQUIRED CAPABILITY 
USASOC strategy 2035 outlines one of the key ARSOF Core Competencies as 
“Living among, training, advising, and fighting alongside the people of foreign cultures 
(operating in the human-centric and personality-dependent domain).”44 This competency 
describes USSF’s mission to conduct unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, or 
security force assistance. These three mission sets are large in scope, and require USSF to 
draw on a wide range of special operations expertise to enable the success of a partner 
force. When conducting these mission sets, as implied in the USASOC Strategy 2035, 
USSF must be prepared to operate and thrive in the operational environment in which it is 
employed, operating alongside a partner force.   
Few environments pose greater operational challenges and risks than operating in 
a cold weather environment. While conducting unconventional warfare, USSF must be 
prepared to self-sustain and conduct operations in a denied or semi-permissive 
environment.45 The conditions in a cold weather environment, more so than any other 
environment, severely impact all aspects of operations, and these impacts must be 
understood in order to ensure success. 
Describing specific tactics, techniques, and procedures for operating in cold 
weather is outside the scope of this research project. This chapter will outline a framework 
recommending an adequate capability measured in three levels, which relates to a specific 
unit’s likely exposure to the environment. Staff sections and command elements, which 
will generally provide mission command, sustainment, and planning support, will likely 
enjoy the comforts provided by a forward or advanced operating base. While it is important 
that these elements understand and have received a basic level of training in cold weather 
operations, it is more crucial that they have an in depth understanding of mission command 
and sustainment considerations as it relates to planning and coordinating operations in the 
                                                 
44 USASOC Strategy-2035 (Fort Bragg: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2016). 
45 Department of the Army, Special operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, FM 3–05.130 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2008). 
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cold weather environment. ODAs and other tactically employed units on the other hand, 
must have the ability to fight and survive in these conditions. The framework outlines a 
capability for each level of training, and each subsequent level builds on the last. This will 
allow commanders to mitigate risk and make better informed decisions regarding unit 
employment and operational planning. 
A. ANTARCTIC METHODOLOGY  
This framework of measuring and recommending a level of proficiency based on 
an individual’s or unit’s likely exposure to the environment is similar to the manner U.S. 
scientists and researchers are trained when conducting research in Antarctica. When all 
U.S. personnel arrive at the McMurdo base, they receive a basic level of training which 
covers the proper wear of their issued cold weather gear, how to identify and prevent cold 
weather injuries, and basic terrain and environmental considerations. Following the initial 
level of training, scientists are then lumped into two other categories based off their 
research objectives and how far they will stray from the safety of a base. Scientists who 
will stay close to the base, but venture into the field on day trips, on foot or utilizing 
vehicles, will receive additional training regarding emergency bivouac procedures, 
familiarity with their issued survival kits, and more in-depth training regarding the 
treatment of cold weather injuries. Scientists who will likely utilize aircraft to travel long 
distances from a base and conduct research in dangerous terrain receive further training on 
extended cold weather survival, communication systems, glacier travel, and route planning 
and selection.46 
This method of requiring a graduated level of proficiency and experience, based on 
a likely level of exposure, is an effective means of managing time and resources. It is 
simply not realistic to expect everyone to be trained to a maximum level of proficiency, 
and so a framework which defines exactly what can be expected of units trained at each 
level allows commanders to better manage training and unit employment based on their 
operational requirements.  
 
                                                 
46 Todd Swain, personal communication, June 20, 2018. 
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B. COLD WEATHER FRAMEWORK 
Figure 3 is a recommended framework developed to measure a unit’s cold weather 
capability (through proficiency in survivability, mobility, and lethality tasks). Proficiency 
is measured in three levels, with the associated tasks under each level. Tasks are further 
divided into subtasks (see the appendix). Level I, II, and III tasks correspond to a unit’s 
likely exposure to the cold weather operational environment. Tactically employed units 
conducting operations are required to master Level II or III tasks (based on duration of 
exposure and mobility requirements), while staff sections and support personnel operating 
from a base are required to master Level I tasks. 
The tasks in Figure 3 are color coded to highlight whether they support mobility, 
survivability, or lethality proficiencies (see Figure 3 legend). These tasks were selected and 
sorted based upon this research effort’s evaluation of the historical case studies, existing 
cold weather doctrine, and potential SOF future operational requirements. This research 
effort defines proficiency in mobility, survivability, and lethality as the components of an 
adequate capability, and the tasks within figure three define what must be mastered in order 
to gain proficiency in those areas.  
The mobility tasks define what is required to move and maneuver effectively in the 
cold weather operational environment. Operators must have the ability to utilize a wide 
range of tactics and equipment including skis, snowshoes, sleds, snow mobiles, and 
wheeled or tracked vehicles. Operators must be able to understand and read terrain, capable 
of identifying dangerous terrain, or recognize conditions that impact speed of travel or 
operational reach. The survivability tasks define what must be mastered to keep operators 
alive in the cold weather operational environment. Understanding injury prevention and 
treatment, proper use of clothing and gear, sustainment, mission planning considerations, 
shelters, camouflage, and rescue operations are crucial to mitigate risk to force. Proficiency 
in lethality builds upon mobility and survivability. In order to achieve lethal effects on the 
enemy, operators must first be able to move through and survive in the cold weather 
operational environment. Once operators arrive at the objective, they must understand how 
the cold weather environment impacts their weapons and communication systems, so they 




Figure 3. Proficiency Framework 
Level I training outlines basic survivability tasks, most of which can be trained 
once, as individual level classroom training. All Soldiers within a command likely to 
operate in a cold environment must receive this level of training at a minimum. While tasks 
five and six (planning/mission command considerations and sustainment: winterization 
and classes of supply considerations) are considered individual training in terms of 
understanding how cold weather impacts these functions, it is important that the staff 
applies this training during collective training events, while providing mission command 
and exercising staff functions during the execution of tactical level training exercises. 
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While these tasks can be trained once at the at the individual level, it should be an annual 
requirement to conduct the tasks collectively during exercises. 
Level II training outlines more advanced survivability, lethality, and mobility tasks 
for tactical units to effectively shoot, move, communicate, and survive in a cold weather 
environment. The majority of these tasks must be trained in the field. While most of the 
tasks are individual level training, collective level training tasks which include route 
planning and selection, and patrol base operations, will employ a number of the other 
mobility and survivability related tasks included in this level of training. Other than the 
tasks: treat cold weather injuries, weapons employment and maintenance, snow 
camouflage, and cold weather effects on batteries and technology, it is recommended that 
level II tasks are trained annually. Once Operators in a unit are proficient at the individual 
level in accomplishing these tasks, all the cold weather specific tasks can be trained 
concurrently with other training events. For example, an ODA tasked with Special 
Reconnaissance (SR), can conduct a SR full mission profile, in a cold weather 
environment, in order to fulfill its training requirement to conduct SR. Many of the level II 
cold weather tasks are executed as a consequence of that training event. Training in this 
manner saves valuable time and resources for the unit. A unit proficient in all level II tasks 
has the capability to conduct short duration (less then 72 hours) operations in cold, but safe, 
non-technical terrain where the unit is not exposed to the risk of avalanches or crevasses.  
Level III training builds upon the proficiency gained in mastering level II tasks. A 
unit proficient in level III tasks acquires the capability to self-sustain for longer periods of 
time in a cold weather environment and operate in more technical, dangerous terrain. 
Dismounted proficiency in snowy terrain is a major distinction between a level II and level 
III certified unit. Advanced cross-country and downhill ski techniques require significant 
skill and a basic level of orientation and exposure is simply not adequate to gain true 
proficiency. Even expert skiers, not experienced in skiing with a heavy pack over 
ungroomed terrain in variable conditions, will find the task challenging. It is imperative 
that every member of the unit gains an acceptable level of proficiency in this task, as the 
unit will only be able to move as quickly or capably as its weakest skier. The unit must 
spend hours, days, and even weeks with heavy loads, on skis, in variable terrain while 
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training other tasks in order to truly gain proficiency. It is extremely important for a unit to 
be honest in its current level of training, and ensure new members to the unit are brought 
up to par before a unit can claim to be level III certified. A unit certified as level III should 
be expected to operate autonomously, cover long distances without vehicular support, and 
sustain operations for long periods (over 72 hours). 
C. MEASURING CAPABILITY 
When measuring a unit’s cold weather warfare capability, a unit should only be 
judged by its least trained member. The cold weather environment poses unique hazards, 
and an Operator untrained in a given task could quickly become a liability and jeopardize 
the mission. One of the problems with SOCOM’s method of measuring the readiness of 
Mountain Detachments, is through the system of measuring individual skill training. In 
order achieve certification as a Mountain Detachment, per the regulation, the Detachment 
must have two “mountain leaders,” four “advanced mountaineers,” and the rest of the 
Detachment must be certified as “basic mountaineers”47 (if the Detachment has one 
mountain leader, they are still considered capable to operate in Alpine terrain, but the 
Commander assumes more risk). This method of measuring a unit’s true capability can 
prove misleading for commanders in terms of risk management and planning. The first 
problem is, all of the training to achieve any one of the three levels of proficiency is 
individual level training, which can be achieved by an Operator attending the appropriate 
school (although operators can gain the qualification of basic mountaineer from a current 
advanced mountaineer). The regulation does not require the unit to perform any of the tasks 
collectively at a designated interval, although annual recertification is required for the 
individual.48 This brings into question a Detachments capability to perform complex tasks 
cohesively and collectively. Secondly, a Mountain Detachment capable to operate in 
Alpine terrain may only have one “mountain leader.” A “mountain leader” may be the only 
member of the Detachment with any training or experience in an Alpine environment, and 
yet, that Detachment is supposed to be completely capable to operate in one. If the 
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Detachment’s “mountain leader” is killed, injured, or otherwise incapacitated during an 
operation or training event in an alpine environment, the remaining members of the 
Detachment may not have the experience required to safely navigate the terrain or complete 
the mission. 
For these reasons, in measuring a unit’s level of proficiency to operate in the cold, 
it is important that the unit is evaluated based upon its capability to conduct collective level 
tasks, as a complete unit. Individual training is important, and if a member of a unit has the 
opportunity to attend advanced cold weather training at one of the training centers, his 
increased capability in no way inherently increases the unit’s overall capability. Until that 
Operator has been able to cross train his entire unit on the training he has received, and the 
unit has the ability to train the tasks collectively, can it be assumed that the unit is 
proficient.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS TO BUILD CAPABILITY 
The problem with building robust cold weather capability within USSF is the fact 
that ODAs simply have more requirements then they have time. Piling on additional 
training requirements in an already time and resource constrained environment is not an 
effective means of obtaining a desired result. Expecting that every ODA will be able to 
obtain Level II proficiency in cold weather tasks is an unreasonable prospect. However, by 
analyzing operational requirements across the Groups, it would be possible to prioritize 
specific units, and begin to build the capability in those most likely required to operate in 
a cold weather environment.  
1st and 10th SFG (A), based on their regional orientation, are far more likely to 
deploy to a cold weather environment. These Groups already formed ad hoc Winter 
Warfare committees, but as addressed in previous chapters, these initiatives are hamstrung 
by funding constraints and a lack of formalized policies. A potential course of action to 
remedy this situation is for 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) (1st SFC (A)), to 
establish formal cold weather training requirements and policies. This technique was 
implemented in formalizing the USSF mountaineering program following the death of 
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Staff Sergeant Jakob J. Nommensen III on Nanda Devi in 1995.49 Unfortunately, it took 
the death of an Operator for USASOC to take the matter of SOF Mountaineering seriously, 
and task USASFC(A) to implement a program to train SOF mountaineers and mitigate risk.  
Hopefully, unlike the case of SSG Nommensen, USASOC and 1st SFC(A) do not 
need to wait for the death of an Operator(s) to realize the risks associated with untrained 
units conducting cold weather warfare. By formalizing a program and policies, 1st SFC 
(A) could provide funding to those groups likely to deploy to a cold weather environment. 
Instead of building a schoolhouse and focusing on individual level training, this research 
effort recommends that 1st SFC (A) provide additional funding to the groups for ODAs to 
execute collective, off-post training (OPT) and Realistic Military Training (RMT) in true 
cold weather environments, such as training venues in Alaska or with partner forces 
OCONUS. This training could utilize the Winter Warfare Committee cadre as master 
trainers, to ensure ODA collective training meets the formalized training requirements 
mandated by 1st SFC (A). The framework developed in this chapter, could be used as a 
base for formalizing policy and training standards. 
Operators should be supported to seek individual level training at any one of the 
pre-existing cold weather training centers so that they can bring back knowledge and cross 
train other operators, but the backbone of training should always be collective. OPTs and 
RMTs are an efficient way to train cold weather tasks, in conjunction with other METL 
based training requirements, by executing the training in a cold weather environment. Cold 
weather tasks can be trained as a consequence of training almost any other ODA METL 
requirement, simply by conducting the training in the proper environment. 
 
 
                                                 
49 Dennis Cook, 4. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. COMMAND EMPHASIS MUST BE PLACED ON COLD WEATHER 
READINESS 
The multi-domain battle concept, 2018 National Defense Strategy, and recent 
actions by peer and near-peer competitors in cold regions of the world should all focus 
Commanders on the necessity of taking the prospect of cold weather warfare seriously. 
USSF as a whole has been focused on the Middle East for almost a generation of 
professional soldiers. As the entire defense apparatus shifts focus, it is important to be 
prepared for the next fight. As the U.S. analyzes at its adversaries, many of the most 
dangerous courses of action will take U.S. troops to a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, in 
the high north of the Baltic states, or other cold climates throughout Eurasia or the Arctic. 
The US’s competitors, and many of its allies, are investing effort into cold weather training, 
and it is vitally important that USSF does not fall behind.  
Unfortunately, the fact is, cold weather is not pleasant. If left to their own devices, 
ODAs will not likely spend their OPT and RMT funding training in frigid environments. 
Command emphasis is required to create a paradigm shift and a sense of urgency amongst 
ODAs to build their cold weather warfare capability. A formalized cold weather program 
funded and implemented by 1st SFC(A) will help to ensure this outcome.  
B. LEADERSHIP IN COLD WEATHER WARFARE 
In addition to command emphasis on training, fighting and training in a cold 
weather environment poses unique, tactical level leadership challenges. Anyone who has 
suffered through the mountain phase of Ranger School in the winter months knows the 
trials faced by leaders attempting to motivate their Soldiers out of their sleeping bags to 
pull security or conduct weapons maintenance. The typical reaction to extreme cold, for 
those unprepared, is to “cocoon” inside oneself. Losing all situational awareness and 
focusing solely one one’s current misery and what can be immediately done to improve 
their current situation. Eventually, the individual becomes sluggish, increasingly 
unmotivated to do literally anything, and they quickly become a liability to themselves and 
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their unit. This is a dangerous phenomenon, and requires leaders constantly to monitor their 
soldiers, and make continuous honest assessments of their condition and capability. The 
only way for leaders to understand what their soldiers are capable of in the cold weather 
environment, and improving upon that, is through repetition and experience. A unit 
operating in the cold for the first time, in combat, will pose a considerable liability. Leaders 
owe it to their soldiers to ensure they are trained and prepared to operate in an environment 
they may be required to fight in. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
The framework developed by this research effort is meant to serve as a starting 
point for formalizing cold weather requirements and standards for USSF. The appendix 
further breaks down the training tasks outlined in chapter four into sub-tasks, but does not 
provide specific TTPs or detailed training agendas. To make training accessible to ODAs, 
a SOF specific cold weather manual would be incredibly valuable. As detailed in Chapter 
Two, current resources and doctrine are primarily focused on conventional units. A SOF-
specific manual, based on the proficiency framework developed by this research effort, 
would provide ODAs with limited or no experience a starting point to help guide training 
events and implement training plans. ODA training is most effective when executed by the 
ODA itself. Providing ODAs the resources to plan and execute their own training will be 
a huge step in advancing capability. 
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APPENDIX 
A. LEVEL I TASKS AND SUB-TASKS 
1. Proper Wear of Clothing and Equipment 
• Layering and wear of ECWCS/Patagonia issued items 
• Overheating and remaining dry 
• Cold weather clothing materials and off the shelf considerations 
• Care of cold weather clothing materials 
• Boots - types and equipment requirements (ski/crampon compatibility) 
• Sleep systems 
• How to pack a rucksack for the cold 
2. Identify and Prevent Cold Weather Injuries 
• Chilblain 
• Frostbite 
• Immersion Syndrome 
• Altitude Illness 
• Hypothermia 
• Snow Blindness 
3. Analyze Terrain and Weather 
• Arctic vs. Subarctic terrain 
• Glaciated terrain 
• Tundra, muskeg, and perma frost 
• Reading clouds and storm types 
4. Risk Management 
• Managing subjective vs. objective environmental hazards 
• Duration of exposure 
• Weather impacts on sustainment (air or ground resupply) 
• Implications of denied or semi-permissive environments 
• Understanding unit capabilities and operational requirements 
5. Planning and Mission Command Considerations 
• Cold Weather impacts on war fighting functions 
• Sustainment: Winterization and classes of supply 
38 
• Proper storage and transport of classes of supply 
• Cold weather impacts on vehicles and maintenance requirements 
• Cold weather specific sustainment (CL III petroleum, oils, and lubricants), 
individual/unit cold weather gear (uniforms, tents, heaters, skis, snowshoes, snow 
chains, tracked vehicles, high consumption of medical supplies) 
• Non-standard logistics considerations 
B. LEVEL 2 TASKS AND SUB-TASKS 
1. Treat Cold Weather Injuries 
• Treatment for chilblain, frostbite, immersion syndrome, hypothermia, snow 
blindness, altitude sickness 
• Nutrition, hydration, prevention 
2. Snowshoe Techniques 
• Wear and maintenance 
• Ski pole usage 
• Breaking trail, ascending and descending 
3. Basic Cross-Country Ski Techniques 
• Wear and maintenance 
• Types of skis 
• Boot and binding options 
• Breaking trail, ascending, descending, and turning 
• Skijouring 
• Skiing with a heavy load 
• Movement formations 
4. Snowmobile Operations 
• Maintenance and operation 
• Recovery 
• Packing and loading 
5. Employing Sleds 
• Types of sleds 
• Rigging 
• Use with Skis, snowshoes, snowmobiles 
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6. Construct Cold Weather Shelters 
• Arctic tents 
• 4 season commercial off the shelf (COT) options 
• Thermal counter-detection 
• Improvised shelters 
• Condensation and insulation 
• Snow caves  
7. Patrol Base Operations in Cold Weather 
• Operations from shelters 
• Zone security 
• Detection and counter-detection 
8. Employing Arctic Heaters 
• Types of heaters 
• Safe operation in various shelter types 
9. Route Planning and Selection 
• Identifying technical or hazardous terrain 
• Detection and counter-detection 
• Vehicular and dismounted movement speed and planning factors 
• Surface impacts on movement (snow type/ice) 
• Temperature effect on dismounted movement 
10. Operating Vehicles in Cold Weather 
• Operating wheeled vehicles on snow and ice 
• Operating tracked vehicles on snow and ice 
• Maintenance considerations 
11. Weapon Employment and Maintenance 
• Impacts on direct fire weapon systems 
• Impacts on indirect fire weapon systems 
• Impacts on long range shooting 
• Lubrication and maintenance 
• Munition storage 
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12. Construct Fighting Positions in Snow Covered Environments 
• Utilizing sleds, skis, ski poles to create stable firing positions 
• Employing weapons while on skis/snowshoes 
13. Snow Camouflage  
• Covering tracks/track deception 
• Utilizing snow drifts, terrain, plowed roads to conceal movement 
• Wear of white over trousers/parkas 
• Mix of snow and foliage 
14. Extreme Latitude/Cold Weather Impact on Communications 
• Aurora borealis impacts on amplitude/frequency modulation 
• SATCOM degraded or inoperable at extreme latitudes 
• Extreme latitude effect on HF 
15. Cold Weather Effects on Batteries and Technology 
• Cold weather effects on batteries 
• Cold weather effects on screens and devices 
• Winterizing equipment and proper storage 
C. LEVEL 3 TASKS AND SUB-TASKS 
1. Advanced Cross-country and Downhill Ski Techniques 
• Skiing with heavy loads in variable conditions 
• Use of Alpine-Touring Skis 
• Ascending/descending steep terrain with skis 
• Long range movements on skis 
2. Movement in Avalanche Terrain 
• Identifying dangerous or avalanche prone terrain 
• Safe route selection 
• Understanding snow types/snow pack/snow structure 
• Types of avalanches and traps 
• Beacons and avalanche rescue 
3. Crevasse Rescue 
• Route selection in glaciated terrain 
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• Roped movement techniques 
• Rescue techniques (5:1, 3:1 pulley systems, buddy and team rescue) 
4. Resupply and Sustainment for Extended Operations 
• Non-standard logistics 
• Air/ground resupply considerations 
5. Considerations when Employing Explosives and Obstacle 
Construction 
• Cold impacts on explosives  
• Utilizing natural obstacles to channelize movement 
• Icebreaking 
• Concealing man-made obstacles 
6. Casualty Care and Transport 
• Long term treatment and care of cold weather injuries 
• Transporting patients 
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